Professor of Economics, Graduate Program Coordinator
Department of Economics and Finance
Email:
rkirkega@uoguelph.ca
Phone number:
ext. 53551
Fax:
519-763-8497
Office:
MacKinnon (MCKN), Room 707
Website links:
René Kirkegaard
Biography
Areas of Specialization: Auction Theory, Contract Theory, Contest Theory.
René Kirkegaard joined the Department of Economics and Finance at the University of Guelph in 2010. He received a B.A in Economics from the University of Aarhus in Denmark (1996), a M.Sc. in Economics from the University of York in England (2000) and the University of Aarhus (2000), and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Aarhus (2004). He has been the Graduate Program Director in the Department of Economics and Finance since 2019/20.
His research interests include auction theory, contract theory, contest theory, and the economics of information more generally. His research has been published in such journals as Econometrica, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, RAND Journal of Economics, and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. He held a Tier II Canada Research Chair at the University of Guelph from 2010 to 2020.
Dr. René Kirkegaard is a professor and graduate program coordinator in the Department of Economics and Finance specializing in auction theory, contract theory, and contest theory.
His recent paper "Endogenous Criteria for Success," published by the Journal of Economic Theory, examines how economic agents are motivated by the prospect of rewards and punishments. In this study, Dr. Kirkegaard examines a scenario where a principal sets criteria for success to motivate an agent to perform certain actions. The paper analyzes how these criteria can be adjusted to balance costs and incentives.
Dr. Kirkegaard's research shows that the criteria for success can be changed based on different constraints, such as budget limits or the need to keep incentives aligned. The findings reveal that, depending on the situation, the agent may be spurred to work even harder than in a perfect world. When the principal's benefits are directly tied to the criteria for success, the solution may involve setting tougher criteria or requiring less action than the ideal scenario to achieve the best possible outcome within the given constraints.
Kirkegaard, R. (2023). Endogenous criteria for success. Journal of Economic Theory, 214, 105760. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105760
René Kirkegaard's working papers and publications are available at:
- RePEc (Research Papers in Economics): https://ideas.repec.org/e/pki48.html#works
- His personal website - http://www.renekirkegaard.com/
Selected publications since 2020:
“Multivariate Incomplete Information in the Mixture Model of Contests”, The RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming (accepted June 2024).
“Endogenous Criteria for Success”, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 214, December 2023, article 105760.
“Contest Design with Stochastic Performance”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15: 201-238, February 2023.
“Contracting with Private Rewards”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 51 (2): 589-612, Summer 2020.