Guelph Lecture in Philosophy
Anyone interested in philosophical ideas, whether timely or timeless, is invited to the Guelph Lecture in Philosophy. Each year an accomplished philosopher presents original, provocative ideas in an accessible way.
March 13, 2014: Christine Korsgaard, “A reasonable structure for animal rights”
5:30–7:00 pm on the ground floor of McLaughlin Library
Free and open to the public
Professor Christine Korsgaard is the Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University’s Department of Philosophy. She works on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, agency, personal identity, and human/animal relations. She is the author of four books. The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge 1996) examines the history of ideas about the foundations of obligation in modern moral philosophy and presents an account of her own. Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge 1996) is a collection of her essays on Kant's ethics. The Constitution of Agency (Oxford, 2008), is a collection of her recent papers on practical reason and moral psychology. And Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, (Oxford, 2009) is about the foundation of morality in the nature of agency.
Abstract: Do animals have moral standing? Why should we care about whether how we treat them is right or wrong? What are the costs of caring, or not caring, about animals? The lecture will discuss possible answers to these questions and invites the audience to engage the debate.
Audio of talk: MP3 format
March 21, 2013: Tim Scanlon, “What is morality?”
Abstract: Why should we care about whether what we do is right or wrong? What are the costs of caring, or not caring, about this? The lecture will discuss possible answers to these questions, with reference to Herman Melville's story, ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’, seen as a story about the failure of moral communication.
March 23, 2011: Sandra Harding, “Objectivity and diversity”
Abstract: Must objective research be disinterested? When formerly excluded social groups begin to enter universities and research labs, all too often the research questions that interest them are seen as inappropriately biased and self-interested and, therefore, unsuitable topics for research. Yet often philosophers as well as the general public have tended to conflate the disinterestedness of researchers with the potential reliability of the results of their research. However, disinterest and reliability are not in fact linked in that way. For example, most of us are not at all disinterested in such prevailing and presumedly reliable research as that conducted on health and environmental issues. Can previously disvalued interests serve to increase the objectivity of research? This presentation will examine how feminist and postcolonial research in particular has attempted to sort out these issues.